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Abstract
Shimer (2005) showed that a standard search and matching model of the labor
market fails to generate °uctuations of unemployment and vacancies of the mag-
nitude observed in US data in response to shocks to average labor productivity
of plausible magnitude. He also suggested that wage determination through Nash
bargaining may be the culprit.
In this paper we pursue two objectives. First, we identify those properties
of Nash bargaining that limit the ability of the model to generate a large re-
sponse of unemployment and vacancies to a shock to average labor productivity.
In light of these properties, cast in terms of a general model of wage determina-
tion, we reinterpret some of the speci¯c solutions proposed so far to this problem.
Second, we examine whether asymmetric information may help to violate those
properties and to provide ampli¯cation. We assume that the ¯rm has private in-
formation about the job's productivity, the worker about the amenity of the job,
and aggregate labor productivity shocks do not change the distribution of private
information around their mean. In this environment, we consider the monopoly
(or monopsony) solution, namely a take-it-or-leave-it o®er, and the constrained ef-
¯cient allocation. We ¯nd that our key properties are satis¯ed for the ¯rst model
essentially under all circumstances. They frequently (for commonly used speci¯c
distributions of beliefs) also apply to the constrained e±cient allocation.
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The search-and-matching framework (Pissarides (2000)) is the workhorse of analysis of
aggregate labor markets and an important component of many quantitative business cy-
cle models. Shimer (2005) recently pointed out that a plausible calibration of a baseline,
representative agent version of the search and matching model driven by labor pro-
ductivity shocks of plausible magnitude and persistence grossly fails to account for the
observed volatility of unemployment and vacancies. Therefore, in spite of its many suc-
cesses, to explain business cycles the search-and-matching model fares no better than a
simple demand-and-supply representative-agent competitive model of the labor market.
Shimer suggests that the weakness of the search-and-matching model may lie in the
assumption of wage determination by Nash bargaining. In response, some authors (e.g.
Hall (2005), Hall and Milgrom (2005)) have considered alternatives to Nash bargaining
that produce a larger response of unemployment and vacancies to labor productivity
shocks. Other authors have taken alternative routes and introduced on-the-job search
and/or heterogeneity of either ¯rms (Krause and Lubik (2004), Costain and Reiter
(2005)) or workers (Nagypal (2004)).
In this paper we focus again on wage determination, but we address the problem
from the opposite angle. We investigate the extent to which the failure of the model
generalizes to other models of wage determination beyond Nash bargaining. Our analysis
proceeds in two steps. First, we identify a few properties of a general model of wage
determination that limit the ability of the search model to produce large °uctuations
in unemployment and vacancies in response to shocks to average labor productivity.
Second, we examine several standard models of wage determination under asymmetric
information, and ask whether they also possess these properties.
In pursuing our objectives we take a methodological shortcut. A fully speci¯ed dy-
namic model of wage determination can be simulated, to compare the predicted volatility
of unemployment and vacancies to the volatility of average labor productivity. This is
the exercise that Shimer (2005) performs for Nash bargaining. However, as a preliminary
exercise, he computes the elasticity of the steady state v=u ratio (ratio of vacancies to
unemployment) to a permanent shock to average labor productivity. His results suggest
that the latter provides a remarkably close approximation to the relative volatilities ob-
tained from the dynamic simulation. It appears that the quality of this approximation
is related to the high persistence of average labor productivity and the rapid transitional
dynamics of the search-and-matching model. Since we are only after qualitative proper-
ties, we do not want to fully specify a model of wage determination that one could then
1subject to simulations. Thus, we will use the shortcut of focussing on the elasticity of
the steady state v=u ratio with respect to average labor productivity.
We show that, in any model that shares with Nash bargaining certain qualitative
properties that we discuss later, this elasticity must be less than an upper bound of the
form:
µ
average productivity (or average wage)
average productivity (or average wage) ¡ °ow utl. of non market activity
¶
£ function(parameters not related to wage determination, data)
This is the product of two terms. The ¯rst term, that we will occasionally refer to as the
markup, measures the relative gains from market vs. non-market activity. In a recent
paper Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005) have made the case that these gains are tiny,
so this term should be calibrated to be perhaps as large as 20, in which case even the
model with Nash bargaining could deliver satisfactory °uctuations in unemployment
and vacancies driven by shocks to average labor productivity. If this term is indeed
large, then our bounds will not be very useful, and indeed unemployment is almost
equivalent to employment, so not even worth studying. However, other calibrations
such as Shimer's assign to this term a much lower value, between 1 and 2. If one prefers
the latter calibration, then the size of the second term becomes crucial. This term,
which we will occasionally refer to as the multiplier, only depends on parameters of the
model not associated with wage determination (the matching function, the interest rate
and the rate of exogenous separations), whose calibration is relatively uncontroversial,
and on the job ¯nding rate that the model is usually calibrated to match.
The properties of wage determination that imply this bound are quite simple. A
general model of wage determination is a rule to share the rents generated by search
frictions. The ¯rst property is that the rents of the ¯rm and the worker depend on
the productivity of the job and on the opportunity cost of the worker only through
their di®erence, the °ow gains from trade. As productivity always determines total
rents, this implies that the worker's opportunity cost also a®ects the ¯rm's rents. The
second property requires that as °ow gains from trade rise, neither party loses rents (the
PDV of gains from trade) in absolute terms, a non trivial restriction because of general
equilibrium e®ects. These two properties imply the above bound with the wage entering
the mark-up. To avoid issues of wage calibration and to express the mark-up in terms
of productivity, we need a third property, which requires that the ¯rm's total rents rise
not too fast in the °ow gains from trade.
When these properties are satis¯ed, two e®ects tame the multiplier. On the one hand,
2if the worker's surplus from employment is positive and not decreasing in °ow gains from
trade, the worker has a better outside option in booms simply because the job-¯nding
rate rises so quickly, even if the net returns to ¯nding a job remains constant. So wages
rise and pro¯ts fall, reducing the multiplier. This feedback e®ect has been the focus of
much recent literature because, in Nash bargaining, both the job ¯nding rate and the
worker surplus are procyclical. However, this e®ect can be moderated by reducing the
worker's share of surplus through an appropriate wage rule. But this requires giving
large pro¯ts to ¯rms. In this case, the observed small variations in labor productivity
are tiny relative to average pro¯ts and, given congestion in hiring, they cannot justify
the observed large swings in the v=u ratio. So weakening the ¯rst, feedback e®ect
reinforces this second, congestion e®ect. Choosing the wage determination mechanism
that optimally balances the two e®ects can raise the multiplier from less than 2 (Shimer's
number) to less than 4, a far cry from the empirical target of about 10.
Interestingly, each of the two e®ects can operate in isolation. Hall and Milgrom
(2005) present a strategic bargaining model that violates the ¯rst property and thus
lacks altogether the feedback e®ect of the job ¯nding rate on wages. This still leaves
room for the congestion e®ect. In fact, in their model the multiplier is small and to
provide ampli¯cation they raise the mark-up by calibrating wages to be very high and
close to the worker's opportunity cost of bargaining further. If one is not willing to
admit a large mark-up, then both the feedback and the congestion e®ect have to be
absent from the chosen wage determination mechanism. This is accomplished by Hall
(2005)'s completely rigid wage, which violates both of our properties, at the cost (for
our comparative statics purposes) of introducing multiplicity of equilibrium wages.
Our second contribution is to verify whether these properties hold in wage determi-
nation models under asymmetric information. The latter has been repeatedly suggested
as a natural direction to escape the tight limits on °uctuations associated with Nash
bargaining, given the freedom in choosing distribution of types. We follow this lead
and assume that, upon being matched, the ¯rm privately draws a match speci¯c pro-
ductivity and the worker a match speci¯c amenity value of the job. This innovation
raises a new issue. With heterogenous productivity, a given increase in average labor
productivity can come about through various changes in the distribution of productivity
across jobs and be associated, for example, with more or less dispersion in productivity.
Kennan (2005) provides an example of substantial ampli¯cation through such interac-
tions. We ask whether introducing asymmetric information can provide ampli¯cation
without interactions between average labor productivity and the distribution of private
3information. Thus we assume that a shock to average labor productivity does not alter
the distributions of productivity and of worker's job amenity around their means.
We study in detail two classic wage determination models under asymmetric infor-
mation. In the the monopoly (or monopsony) solution, where either the ¯rm or the
worker makes a take-it-or-leave-it wage proposal to the other privately informed party,
our properties and elasticity bound apply under very weak assumptions about the dis-
tribution of private information, particularly in the ¯rm o®er case. For the constrained
e±cient allocation, obtained with the help of a mediator (e.g. an arbitrator in wage con-
tracting), as in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), our analysis is in progress. So far, we
have been able to show that the bound applies (with some slack) when the distribution of
private information is the same for workers and ¯rms, but otherwise fairly unrestricted,
and in an asymmetric example. We also analyze in some detail the case of symmetric
uniform distributions, the canonical example in the literature on two-sided asymmetric
information. From these applications, we draw the following conclusion. The properties
of Nash bargaining that are responsible for the failure of the search model as a business
cycle tool are fairly weak, and even failure of one of them may not be su±cient to pro-
vide the desired ampli¯cation. In other words, for the purpose of business cycle analysis,
Nash bargaining is an excellent approximation to a large class of wage determination
mechanisms even in the presence of private information.
In Section 2 we introduce the economy, in Section 3 we de¯ne our notion of a model of
wage determination. We discuss Nash bargaining and de¯ne its properties that mute the
response of the steady state v=u ratio to a permanent shock to average labor productivity.
We also discuss some models of wage determination that have been shown to imply large
°uctuations in unemployment and vacancies, and we illustrate which of these properties
of Nash bargaining they violate. The bounds are derived in Section 4. We then consider
models of wage determination in the presence of asymmetric information. Section 5 is
devoted to monopoly, and 6 to the constrained e±cient allocation. Section 7 reviews
our results and concludes.
2 The Economy
We consider a search-and-matching model of the labor market µ a la Pissarides (1985).
We extend it to allow for bilateral asymmetric information about match-speci¯c values:
the worker may ignore how much output she is producing for the ¯rm, and the employer
how much the worker likes the job.
4The economy is populated by a measure 1 of workers and a much larger measure
of ¯rms. All agents are in¯nitely-lived, risk neutral and share the discount rate r > 0.
Workers can either be employed or unemployed. An unemployed worker receives °ow
utility b and searches for a job. Employed workers receive endogenously determined
wage payments from their employers and cannot search for other jobs. Firms can search
for a worker by maintaining an open vacancy at °ow cost c. Free entry implies that the
value of an open vacancy is zero. Unemployed workers and vacancies are matched at
rate m(u;v) where m is a constant returns to scale matching function. Let µ ´ v
u denote
the vacancy/unemployment ratio. Then vacancies are matched at rate m(1=µ;1) ´ q(µ)
and workers are matched at rate m(1;µ) = q(µ)µ.
Upon being matched, the worker draws a match speci¯c amenity value z from the
distribution FZ and the ¯rm draws a match speci¯c productivity component y from the
distribution FY. The draws are once and for all until the match dissolves. Without loss
in generality, the two distributions have mean zero. Output of the match is given by
p + y, so p is ex ante average labor productivity. However, in general, not all matches
are formed and p will not equal labor productivity averaged across existing matches. We
will refer to p as the aggregate component of labor productivity. The amenity value z
adds to the wage to determine the °ow value of employment for the worker. This value z
may be private information of the worker, and the idiosyncratic productivity component
y may be private information of the ¯rm. Matches are destroyed exogenously at rate ±.
Shimer (2005) considers the representative agent complete information version of this
model. He simulates the dynamics of the economy driven by a ¯rst order Markov process
for labor productivity p. He shows that °uctuations in p of plausible magnitude cannot
generate observed business-cycle-frequency °uctuations in unemployment and vacancies
if wages are determined by Nash bargaining (from now on: NB).1 As a preliminary
exercise, Shimer computes the steady state of the model for constant labor productivity
p, and computes the elasticity of the v/u ratio with respect to labor productivity p
under the assumption that wages are determined by NB. He argues that this elasticity
is small for plausible parameter values. In this paper we focus on the latter exercise.
We argue that this elasticity is small for plausible parameter values for a much larger
class of models of wage determination that share some of the properties of NB. We
conjecture that models in which this comparative statics elasticity is small will also be
1As well known, in the search model with risk neutral agents there is no substantive distinction
between productivity and demand shocks. The primitive shock is to the returns to market vs. non-
market activities, so labor productivity may well be endogenous. Whatever the primitive driving force,
at stake is the comovement of productivity with unemployment.
5unable to generate substantial °uctuations in simulations with a stochastic process for
labor productivity. This would require specifying the wage-setting rule, while we are
mainly concerned with the implications of a broad class of such rules.
3 Models of Wage Determination
We think of a model of wage determination as pinning down the value of the match
and how it is split between the worker and the ¯rm. We are interested in the general
equilibrium e®ects of changes in productivity p on the division of rents and, consequently,
on unemployment. Each match takes the outside options, the utility of unemployment
U for the worker and zero for the ¯rm by free entry, as given, and internalizes the direct
e®ects of changes in p on the rents. In equilibrium, the outside option U also changes,
and we capture this e®ect through the °ow value n = rU.
We allow the outcome of wage determination to depend on the aggregate component
of labor productivity p, the °ow value of unemployment n, and the match speci¯c values
y and z. Let W(y;z;p;n) denote the value of employment to the worker given the °ow
outside option n, G(y;z;p;n) = W(y;z;p;n)¡U the capital gain from the job obtained
by the worker, and J(y;z;p;n) the corresponding capital gain for the ¯rm (which is
the value of the job, since the outside option of the ¯rm is zero). These values are
conditional on private information draws y;z, that is, on trade (on the match forming).
Let x(y;z;p;n) be the probability that the match is formed given an outcome y;z: Then
we can de¯ne the unconditional counterparts, namely, the ex ante chance of trading and
the expected rents to workers and ¯rms, taking into account the possibility that the










A model of wage determination is then a a triple ­ = fG;J;»g. We could de¯ne it in
terms of conditional values, fG;J;xg, but our key properties will be in terms of objects
in ­. Notice that by adopting this formulation we implicitly assume that the outcome
of the wage determination model is unique. Multiplicity of equilibria is one way that
has been considered to escape the tight bounds on labor market °uctuations associated
with NB (see the wage norm example below).
6Our ¯rst objective is to identify those properties of NB that are responsible for
the limited ability of the model to generate large °uctuations in unemployment and
vacancies. Under complete information, the generalized NB solution selects a wage to
maximize G¯J1¡¯ for some ¯ 2 [0;1]. As is standard, this implies that the total surplus
G + J is shared between the worker and the ¯rm with shares ¯ and 1 ¡ ¯, respectively:
in °ow terms
(r + ±)G(y;z;p;n) = x(y;z;p;n)¯(p ¡ n + y + z);
(r + ±)J(y;z;p;n) = x(y;z;p;n)(1 ¡ ¯)(p ¡ n + y + z):
The probability of trade is one if the match has a positive surplus, zero otherwise:
x(y;z;p;n) = Ifp ¡ n + y + z ¸ 0g (2)
where I is an indicator function. Notice that the functions G, J and x depend on p and
n only through their di®erence p¡n. Since y and z have mean zero, and the °ow gains
from trade are p + y + z ¡ n, we can think of p ¡ n as the mean gains from trade. If p
and n increase by the same amount, this leaves the rents G and J unchanged, and only
changes the location of the bargaining problem. With NB, an equal change in p and
n that does not change the °ow gains from trade also leaves the total rents and their
division unchanged. Therefore, also G, J and » depend only on p ¡ n. This property
motivates the ¯rst de¯nition.
De¯nition 1 Location Invariance. A model of wage determination ­ = fG;J;xg
satis¯es Location Invariance if the functions G, J and » depend on p and n only through
their di®erence p ¡ n.
Each of the upper bounds that we will derive in Section 4 requires this property.
Indeed, some of the other properties that we will rely on are only de¯ned for location
invariant models of wage determination.
A feature of the trading rule (2) is that the probability of trade is non-decreasing in
both y and z. That is, trade is more likely if the ¯rm draws a high productivity or the
worker draws a higher amenity value of the job. This suggests that existing matches are
better than the average match draw.
De¯nition 2 Positive Selection. A location invariant model of wage determination
­ = fG;J;xg satis¯es Positive Selection if the average match speci¯c productivity and
7the average match speci¯c amenity value z conditional on trade (observed among active
jobs) exceed their unconditional counterparts, hence are non-negative


















In order to obtain bounds on the elasticity of the v-u ratio we need to be able to take
derivatives. So for each model of wage determination we will make su±cient assumptions
(usually concerning smoothness of the distribution functions FZ and FY) to guarantee
that the functions »(p¡n); G(p¡n) and J(p¡n) are di®erentiable. For NB, one then
obtains from the envelope theorem
(r + ±)G
0(p ¡ n) = ¯»(p ¡ n)
(r + ±)J
0(p ¡ n) = (1 ¡ ¯)»(p ¡ n):
Since the trading decision is privately e±cient, at the margin it is not a®ected by a
change in p ¡ n. Only the direct e®ect remains, which is to increase expected surplus
by the fraction of matches where it is positive, namely »(p ¡ n): This property of NB
motivates:
De¯nition 3 Increasing Rents. A location invariant model of wage determination
­ = fG;J;xg satis¯es Increasing Worker's (Firm's) Rents if G0 ¸ 0 (J 0 ¸ 0).
De¯nition 4 Regular Rents. A location invariant model of wage determination ­ =
fG;J;xg satis¯es Regular Firm's Rents if (r + ±)J 0 · ».
If trade is ex post e±cient, as with NB, then (r+±)[G0(p¡n)+J 0(p¡n)] = »(p¡n),
so Regular Firm's Rents is equivalent to Increasing Worker's Rents. If trade is ex
post ine±cient, the property of Regular Firm's Rents arises naturally from an envelope
theorem argument if wages are the solution of a maximization problem of the ¯rm (as
in the case of Monopoly with ¯rm o®ers).
Before analyzing how these properties of NB are related to the limited ability of the
model to generate large °uctuations in unemployment and vacancies, we discuss two
examples of models of wage determination that have been suggested as a remedy of this
limited ability and that violate some of the properties introduced above.
84 Bounds on Labor Market Fluctuations
In this section we present several upper bounds on the the elasticity of the steady state
v=u ratio with respect to the aggregate component of labor productivity p. As discussed
in the Introduction, we focus on the steady state elasticity "µ = µpp=µ, as previous
research suggests that this yields a good approximation to the relative volatility of the
v=u ratio and labor productivity obtained from dynamic simulations.
Whether a particular bound applies depends on whether the model of wage deter-
mination satis¯es a corresponding set of the four properties discussed in the previous
section (De¯nition 1-4). Location Invariance is always in the picture, so we will simplify
notation by already using this property when writing the steady state conditions.
Steady State Equilibrium and Comparative Statics. We characterize the steady
state equilibrium of the search model when productivity is constant at p. Upper bars
denote the steady state values of the endogenous variables. The steady state values of the
two endogenous variables ¹ µ and ¹ n are determined by two equations. First, the free entry
condition, equating the °ow cost of posting a vacancy c to the expected capital gain,
which is the rate q(µ) at which open vacancies receive applications, times the expected
value J(p ¡ n) to the ¯rm of an application, taking into account that the match may
potentially fail to form:
c = q(¹ µ)J(p ¡ ¹ n): (5)
Second, the Bellman equation determining the °ow value of unemployment as the °ow
value of leisure b plus the expected capital gain, the rate q(µ)µ at which unemployed
workers contact open vacancies times the expected return G(p ¡ n) from the contact,
again taking into account that the match may potentially fail to form:
¹ n = b + q(¹ µ)¹ µG(p ¡ ¹ n): (6)
A well-known property of this search model is that an unanticipated permanent shock
to any parameter causes µ = v=u, thus n, to jump immediately to its new steady
state, while the levels of unemployment u and vacancies v exhibit transitional dynamics.
Therefore, the above equations describe the state of the economy both before and after
a once-and-for all change in p.
We log-di®erentiate the system of equations (5){(6) with respect to the productivity
parameter p and evaluate the derivatives at steady state values. Let "µ denote the
elasticity of ¹ µ with respect to p, ¹ np be the derivative of the °ow value of unemployment
9with respect to p, and ¹ ´ = 1¡q0(¹ µ)¹ µ=q(¹ µ) denote the elasticity of the matching function
with respect to vacancies, all evaluated at the steady state. Then
(1 ¡ ¹ ´)"µ =
¹ J 0(p ¡ ¹ n)
¹ J(p ¡ ¹ n)
(1 ¡ ¹ np)p; (7)
¹ npp
¹ n ¡ b
= ¹ ´"µ +
¹ G0(p ¡ ¹ n)
¹ G(p ¡ ¹ n)
(1 ¡ ¹ np)p: (8)
De¯ne the average payment that workers receive conditional on trade,
¹ w ´
(r + ±)¹ G
¹ »
+ ¹ n ¡ ¹ Z;
(notice that the average amenity value must be deducted from the average °ow utility
of an employed worker in order to obtain observable wage payments), the job ¯nding
rate
¹ h ´ ¹ f¹ »;
the product of the matching rate ¹ f and the probability of match formation ¹ »,and ¯nally
observed average labor productivity, the average of p + y conditional on trade
¹ A ´ p + ¹ Y:
Notice that Positive Selection implies ¹ A ¸ p: since only relatively good matches are
implemented, average labor productivity conditional on trade is higher than its uncon-
ditional counterpart. We use these equations and de¯nitions to derive our bounds on
the elasticity "µ of interest.
The First Bound. The key properties that we will use in deriving the ¯rst bound are
Increasing Firm's Rents and Increasing Worker's Rents. The bound will be obtained by
contradiction. As a ¯rst step, we combine equations (6) and (8) to obtain
1 ¡ ¹ np =
1
1 + ¹ f ¹ G0
·
1 ¡ ¹ ´"µ
¹ h
r + ± + ¹ h




The left hand side is the derivative of the °ow gains from trade p ¡ n with respect to
p evaluated at the steady state. Now suppose "µ is so large such the term in square
brackets on the right hand side of this equation is negative. As we assumed Increasing
Worker's Rents G0 ¸ 0, this implies that the left hand side 1¡¹ np is negative as well. Thus
the increase in the outside option n is so large that it overturns the increase in p, and the
°ow gains from trade p ¡ n decrease. However, consulting (7), the decrease in p ¡ n in
10conjunction with Increasing Firm's Rents J 0 ¸ 0 implies a negative elasticity "µ. This
contradicts the initial assumption that "µ is su±ciently large to make the term in square
brackets negative. It follows that "µ must be small enough so that the term in square
brackets is nonnegative, and this requirement gives rise to our ¯rst bound. In order to be
able to express this bound in terms of observables, we make the additional assumption
that the Model of Wage Determination satis¯es Positive Selection. This allows us to
replace the unobservable magnitudes p and (r+±)¹ G=¹ »+¹ n with the observable magnitudes
¹ A ¸ p and ¹ w · (r+±)¹ G=¹ »+¹ n, respectively, to keep the term in square brackets positive.
So we obtain:
Proposition 1 If the model of wage determination satis¯es (i) Location Invariance, (ii)










r + ± + ¹ h
¹ h
¶
This bound has the general structure illustrated in the Introduction, a mark-up from
market activity times a multiplier. Notice that even if the worker's rents do not rise,
G0 = 0, an increase in average labor productivity has a positive e®ect on the worker's
outside option n; through the higher job-¯nding rate: ¹ np = ¹ ´"µ(¹ n¡b). If the job ¯nding
rate responds strongly to labor market tightness (high ¹ ´), if labor market tightness
responds strongly to productivity (high "µ), and if the °ow value of unemployment ¹ n
is much larger that the °ow utility b, then n will respond strongly to an increase in
productivity. The strength of this e®ect depends on the wedge ¹ n ¡ b between the °ow
outside options of the worker, endogenous ¹ n minus exogenous (value of leisure) b. In
turn, from equation (6), ¹ n ¡ b =
¹ h
r+±+¹ h
(r+±)¹ G+¹ »(¹ n¡b)
¹ »p , so this wedge is large (and the
outside option is very sensitive to the job-¯nding rate) if employment is on average a lot
better than non market activity and if the job ¯nding rate is high.
To put a number on this bound, we follow the calibration of Shimer (2005). We take
from him values for the exogenous parameters r, ± and ´ = ¹ ´ (Panel A of Table 1).
The model should match two empirical values, the job ¯nding rate ¹ h and the average
productivity to average wage ratio ¹ A= ¹ w. Panel B of the table reports the value 1.35
of the job ¯nding rate found by Shimer for US data. We have not yet constructed a
careful empirical analog of the ratio of average labor productivity to the average wage
¹ A= ¹ w. To be on the safe side, we pick a value of 1.2.2 Panel C of the table computes the






¹ f¹ h takes the value
2Notice that in a frictionless competitive equilibrium we would have
¹ A



























4:64. Since both ¹ A= ¹ w and r+±+¹ h
¹ h are not much larger than one, the magnitude of this
term is mainly due to ¹ ´¡1.
If b is set to 40 percent of the wage, then the overall upper bound on the elasticity "µ
equals 7.74. This value is very sensitive to the elasticity of matching to job creation ¹ ´.
In particular for ¹ ´ = 0:5 the bound drops to 4.33. Contrast these values with Shimer's
¯nding that, in the US, the v=u ratio is roughly 20 times as volatile as average labor
productivity. The bound is not very sensitive to r + ± nor ¹ A= ¹ w, so relaxing the bound
towards the desired empirical target of 20 requires a much lower value of ¹ ´ than the 0.28
chosen by Shimer, or lower gains for workers from market activity ¹ w¡b. We should add
that ¹ ´ = 0:28 is already at the lower end of the range of estimates in the literature (see
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a survey).
12The Second Bound. Equation (7) can also be solved explicitly for a speci¯c positive
value of the elasticity "µ. Substituting equation (9) into equation (7) yields
"µ =
¹ A ¡ ¹ Y
¹ A + ¹ Z ¡ b
¢
1
¹ »(1+ ¹ f ¹ G0)
(r+±) ¹ J 0 (1 ¡ ¹ ¯) 1
1
1¡¹ ´
+ ¹ ¯ 1
1
¹ ´
r+±+¹ » ¹ f




(r + ±)¹ G + ¹ » ¢ (¹ n ¡ b)
¹ »( ¹ A + ¹ Z ¡ b)
= 1 ¡
(r + ±) ¹ J
¹ »( ¹ A + ¹ Z ¡ b)
is the share of the °ow gain from market activity ¹ A + ¹ Z ¡ b that goes to the worker.
Proposition 2 If the model of wage determination satis¯es (i) Location Invariance, (ii)
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1
¹ ´
r+±+¹ » ¹ f
¹ » ¹ f
·
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¹ A ¡ b
(
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r + ± + ¹ » ¹ f
¹ » ¹ f
¶¡1)¡1
The ¯rst line follows from Increasing Worker's Rents (1+ ¹ f ¹ G0 ¸ 1) and from Increasing
and Regular Firm's Rents (0 · (r + ±) ¹ J 0 · ¹ »). The second line follows from Positive
Selection. ¥
Notice the structure of Equation (10): up to the \mark-up" factor
¹ A¡ ¹ Y
¹ A+ ¹ Z¡b, the mul-
tiplier is almost the harmonic weighted average of the two terms 1
1¡¹ ´ and 1
¹ ´
r+±+¹ h
¹ h , with
weights equal to the shares ¹ ¯;1 ¡ ¹ ¯. The second term is familiar from the bound of
Proposition 1, and a low value of this term is associated with a low value of the elasticity
"µ for the reasons discussed earlier. The ¯rst term of the average (1¡¹ ´)¡1 captures con-
gestion e®ects. A low ¹ ´ implies that an increase in labor market tightness has a strong
negative e®ect on the rate at which vacancies are matched with workers. Holding con-
stant the increase in the value of a match to the ¯rm due to the increase in productivity,
labor market tightness cannot respond much if vacancy congestion is severe.
If all the gains from market activity go to the ¯rm (¹ ¯ ! 0), then ¯nding a job entails
no capital gain for the worker, and consequently an increase in the job ¯nding rate does
13not help her outside option. In this case, only congestion e®ects limit the value of the
elasticity "µ. At the other extreme, if ¯rms receive only very little of the gains from
market activity (¹ ¯ ! 1), a given absolute increase in the ¯rm's rents will be very large
in percentage terms, so the scope for an increase in labor market tightness is large even
if congestion e®ects are strong. Notice that a large discount factor r + ± makes ¯rm's
returns even smaller in absolute terms, and their increase even larger in percentage
terms. In this case, vacancy congestion (1 ¡ ¹ ´)¡1 is not an important limiting factor
for the magnitude of "µ. Finally, a high response of the worker's value (high ¹ G0) must
occur at least in part the expense of the ¯rm, amplifying the importance of congestion.
A similar e®ect obviously stems from a low ¹ J 0.
In contrast to the ¯rst bound (Proposition 1), which of course still applies, this
second bound also has to reckon with congestion e®ects. If congestion e®ects are strong
so that the maximum operator in (11) yields (1 ¡ ¹ ´)¡1, the second bound may be less
tight than the previous one. This is not the case for the parameter values of Table 1
since (1 ¡ ´)¡1 = 1:39 is much smaller than 1
´
r+±+¹ h
¹ h = 3:87, so the second bound (when
it does apply) signi¯cantly sharpens the ¯rst one. Once again, this is mainly due to
the low value of the elasticity of matching to vacancy, ´ = 0:28. For ´ = 0:5 the two
numbers are much closer, at 2 and 2:17, respectively. Notice also from Table 1 that
r + ± << ¹ h; so the second bound in equation (11) is approximately
"µ ·
¹ A









and the \multiplier" is determined uniquely by congestion e®ects on either side of the
market. The bound is tightest when the two e®ects are equal, at ¹ ´ = 0:5.
Example: Nash bargaining without heterogeneity Without heterogeneity, ¹ A =
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r + ± + ¹ h¯
(r + ±)(1 ¡ ¹ ´) + ¹ h¯




1¡¹ ´. For ¯ = 0 workers do
not participate in the gains from market activity, so as discussed above only congestion
e®ects limit labor market °uctuations. It is clear from the formula above that this yields
the highest elasticity attainable with NB. As discussed above, with Shimer's calibration
the congestion e®ect is associated with a much tighter limit on °uctuations than the
14feedback e®ect due to the low value of ¹ ´ = 0:28. So the highest elasticity attainable with
NB is substantially lower than our second bound. If Shimer's calibration is modi¯ed by
setting ¹ ´ = 0:5, then the limits imposed by congestion and feedback are more balanced,
and NB bargaining can attain an elasticity of 3.33 while our second bound takes the value
"µ = 3:61. Thus for this value of ¹ ´ NB almost attains our bound, which would imply
that no Model of Wage Determination satisfying the properties used in Propositions 1
and 2 can yield signi¯cantly more ampli¯cation than NB.3
Example: Constant Wage. Consider the model that simply speci¯es a constant
exogenous wage. If p and n increase by the same amount, the wage would have to move
along in order for the split of the rents to remain unchanged, so this model violates
Location Invariance.
Example: Double Auction (Hall (2005)). Hall (2005) considers a more sophisti-
cated model of wage determination with implications similar to a constant wage, namely
a double auction. With symmetric information any split of the surplus is an equilib-
rium of the double auction. As p and n rise by the same amount, say ¢, the set of
equilibria, an interval of the real line, also shifts up by the same ¢. So the productivity-
wage wedge and the wage-outside option wedge for the same job are unchanged. In
this broader sense, the model exhibits Location Invariance, although strictly speaking
the multiplicity of equilibria does not allow to apply its formal de¯nition. However, the
presence of multiplicity can be exploited to select di®erent splits of the rents for di®erent
values of p and n, even if overall the °ow gains from trade p ¡ n are the same. This
is what Hall's equilibrium selection of a constant wage accomplishes. The ampli¯cation
of productivity shocks is guaranteed by the large average wage (96% of average labor
productivity) which compresses pro¯ts and tames the congestion e®ect.
Example: Outside Option Principle (Hall and Milgrom (2005)) Hall and
Milgrom (2005) replace the standard NB assumption of the Mortensen-Pissarides model
with the bargaining theory of Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986). According
to this theory, the relevant threat point of the worker is not unemployment but delay
of bargaining. Now suppose p and n increase by the same amount but the cost of
delay to the worker remains unchanged (it does not fall one for one with the increase in
n). Then the split of the match rents will not remain the same, so this model of wage
3An alternative way of putting this is as follows. If ¹ ´ ¸ r+±+h
r+±+2h (´ ¸ 0:52 using Shimer's calibration
of r, ± and h), the second bound is attainable through NB by setting ¯ = 0.
15determination fails Location Invariance, and the feedback e®ect disappears. Nonetheless,
as discussed in the Introduction, the congestion e®ect remains. This model can generate
large unemployment °uctuations in response to plausible productivity shocks only if the
cost of delay is calibrated so as to generate a large bias in favor of the worker. This
makes the wage high relative to average productivity and small relative to the threat
point, creating a large mark-up.
The Third Bound. While the second bound is more appealing than the ¯rst one
because it does not require a calibration of the average wage, the additional properties
that it requires may be restrictive. As we shall see in the case of the constrained e±cient
allocation considered in Section 6, this is particularly true for the property of Regular
Firm's Rents. The latter condition can be dispensed with in the special case of symmetry.
De¯nition 5 Symmetry. A model of wage determination ­ = fG;J;xg is Symmetric
if G = J.
Proposition 3 If the model of wage determination satis¯es (i) Location Invariance, (ii)
Positive Selection, (iii) Increasing Firm's Rents, and (iv) Symmetry, then
"µ ·
¹ A






1 ¡ ¹ ´
;
r + ± + ¹ h
¹ ´
À
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 3, noting that under symmetry
and increasing gain from trade
¹ »
1 + ¹ f ¹ G0
(r + ±) ¹ J 0 = ¹ »
1 + ¹ f ¹ G0







It is immediate to verify that the multiplier of the third bound is usually pinned
down by the second term in the maximum, as ¹ h >> r+± and ¹ ´ is not too close to either
0 or 1. That is, for plausible parameter values, in the symmetric case what really binds
is the feedback e®ect
Heterogeneity. We conclude this section on upper bounds by turning to an issue
that we have glossed over so far. In Shimer (2005)'s setup matches are homogenous,
so p is average labor productivity. Thus, "µ is the elasticity of the v=u ratio with
respect to average labor productivity, the appropriate comparative statics counterpart
of the empirical values of relative standard deviations of the v=u ratio and average
16labor productivity. The fact that in Shimer's setup the elasticity also provides a good
quantitative approximation of the relative standard deviation is our justi¯cation for
studying upper bounds on this elasticity.
However, in our setup with heterogeneity p is the ex ante, not the ex post, average
labor productivity. The actual average productivity ¹ A is endogenous, due to selec-
tion. Thus the appropriate comparative statics counterpart for the relative standard
deviation¡in the sense of relating the same economic concepts¡is not "µ, but rather the
ratio between "µ and the elasticity " ¹ A of average labor productivity ¹ A with respect to
p. The bounds on "µ that we have obtained apply, strenghtened, to "µ=" ¹ A if " ¹ A ¸ 1, or,
d ¹ A=dp ¸ ¹ A=p. Notice that, by positive selection, ¹ A=p = 1 + Y=p¸1: This means that,
when aggregate productivity is higher, the quality of implemented new matches must
not worsen, and in fact improve su±ciently. This is typically not the case in any the
models of wage determination that we analyze.
One observation, however, soothes this concern. When p increases by a small ¢p,
the change in labor productivity that we observe in the data is equal to ¢p for existing
matches, where selection has already taken place, and to ¢ ¹ A for new matches. So the
total change in average labor productivity is a weighted average of the two. Since the
overwhelming majority of jobs that are active at each point in time in the US economy
existed before this quarter, this weighted average is dominated by ¢p; thus our bounds
should be appropriate. However, this argument does not apply when p falls. If p
decreases by ¢p, then the decrease in average labor productivity of existing matches
will in general be less than ¢p due to selective destruction of poor matches.
This discussion suggests an alternative avenue to resolve the shortcoming of the
search model as a tool of analysis of business cycles. The existing literature uniformly
assumes that labor productivity shocks a®ect all jobs, pre-existing and new. But the
model tells us that job creation is driven only by the productivity of new jobs. If, for
some reason, existing jobs's productivity does not change, and all movement is at the
margin, as in a vintage capital model, a 2% change observed in average labor productivity
implies a many-fold change in the productivity of new jobs. More generally, a strong
procyclicality in the quality of new matches, relative to the existing ones (as for example
in Moscarini (2001)'s Roy model with search frictions), could be enough to explain the
empirically observed °uctuations in average productivity and in unemployment. Costain
and Reiter (2005) explore this avenue.
Having found several bounds, we now go through some particularly interesting exten-
sive forms of the bargaining game, speci¯cally, the monopoly solution and the e±cient
17mechanism. For each extensive form, we verify whether and under what conditions the
equilibrium is unique and satis¯es the assumptions of one of our earlier Propositions.
5 Monopoly
In this section we consider the game in which the privately informed party makes a
take-it-or-leave-it o®er to the uninformed party. If accepted, the o®er is binding for
both parties until exogenous separation. This game has a unique equilibrium, which is
constrained ex ante e±cient in the sense that the o®er-making party's welfare cannot
be improved further given information asymmetry (Satterthwaite and Williams (1989)).
This equilibrium does not, however, maximize ex ante gains from trade, due to the
monopoly distortion. We analyze separately the two cases of unilateral wage o®er by
the ¯rm and wage request by the worker, because the properties used to derive the
second bound are not symmetric for ¯rms and workers.
5.1 Unilateral Wage O®er by the Firm
The Optimal Wage O®er. Consider a ¯rm of type y. If it o®ers a wage wM, then
the worker is indi®erent between taking the job and staying unemployed if his amenity
value is zM = n ¡ wM, and the ¯rm obtains pro¯ts p + y ¡ wM = p ¡ n + y + zM.
Thus the o®er is accepted for amenity values z ¸ zM. One can equivalently think of the
¯rm choosing the threshold zM or the wage wM, and adopting the former approach the
objective of of the ¯rm is to maximize
[1 ¡ FZ(zM)](p ¡ n + y + zM): (12)
The ¯rst term is the probability of trade and the second term is the payo® of the ¯rm
p + y ¡ wM after paying wM = n ¡ zM. The ¯rst order condition is





The left hand side is the gain from trading with an additional worker. However, if the
¯rm wants to trade with more workers, it has to pay higher informational rents to the
workers (types, values of z) it is already trading with. The right hand side gives the
number of workers that receive higher rents relative to the number of workers gained
from reducing zM.
We now introduce an assumption about private information that will allow us to
verify all the properties in De¯nitions 1-4.
18Assumption 1 a. The distributions FY and FZ have support [y; ¹ y] and [z; ¹ z], respec-
tively, with y, z, ¹ y, ¹ z 2 ¹ R.
b. The \virtual valuations" y ¡
1¡FY (y)
F0
Y (y) and z ¡
1¡FZ(z)
F0
Z(z) are strictly increasing and
continuously di®erentiable on [y; ¹ y] and [z; ¹ z], respectively.
We allow for ¯nite lower and upper bounds. Thus the solution to the ¯rm's problem
could be at a corner, and one may expect that corner solutions may generate su±cient
wage rigidity to escape the bounds. We will show that this is not the case. Part (b) of
the assumption insures that if the ¯rst order condition (13) has an interior solution, it is
unique, di®erentiable, and the global maximizer. Let zM(p ¡ n + y) denote the optimal
amenity threshold, such that a worker accepts the wage o®er if and only if she draws
an amenity z ¸ zM for the job. This threshold equals the lower bound z (the o®er is
accepted for sure) if p ¡ n + y + z ¸
1¡FZ(z)
F0
Z(z) , that is if the gain from trading with more
workers always outweighs the cost of higher informational rents. It equals the upper
bound ¹ z (the o®er is rejected for sure) if p ¡ n + y + ¹ z ·
1¡FZ(¹ z)
F0
Z(¹ z) : In this case no trade
takes place and the model is trivial, so we rule this case out by assumption.
It is now straightforward to map this model of wage determination into the notation
of Section 3:
x(y;z;p;n) = Ifz ¸ zM(p ¡ n + y)g (14)
G(y;z;p;n) = x(y;z;p;n)




p ¡ n + y + zM(p ¡ n + y)
r + ±
: (16)
We now verify that this model of wage determination satis¯es the properties introduced
in Section 3.
Location Invariance. It is immediate from equations (14){(16) that the functions x,
G and J depend on p and n only through the di®erence p¡n. As with NB, an increase
in p and n by the same amount just shifts the location of the ¯rm's problem, and leaves
the division of rents una®acted.
Positive Selection. Inspecting the ¯rm's objective in (12), an increase in p ¡ n + y
raises the marginal gain from trade by lowering the threshold zM. By a monotone
comparative statics argument, or by the implicit function theorem, zM(p¡n+y) is weakly
decreasing (and strictly so over the range where the solution is interior). Consulting
equation (14), this implies that x(p;n;y;z) is non-decreasing in both y and z.
19Increasing Worker's Rents. As a ¯rst step, it is convenient to de¯ne the worker's
average gains from trading with a ¯rm of type y:
(r + ±)G(p ¡ njy) ´
Z ¹ z
zM(p¡n+y)
[z ¡ zM(p ¡ n + y)]dFZ(z)
This function is di®erentiable except possibly at the two threshold values where the ¯rst
order condition holds with equality for the corners z and ¹ z, with
(r + ±)G
0(p ¡ njy) = ¡z
0
M(p ¡ n + y)[FZ(zM(p ¡ n + y))] ¸ 0:
The ¯rm expands the range of workers it is trading with by ¡z0
M(p ¡ n + y), so the
informational rents of all worker types that it is already trading with have to increase
by exactly this amount. By de¯nition G(p ¡ n) =
R
G(p ¡ njy)dFY(y); so that
G




which establishes di®erentiability. Since G0(p ¡ njy) ¸ 0, also G0(p ¡ n) ¸ 0, that is
worker's rents are increasing.
Regular Firm's Rents. The maximized value for ¯rm type y is
(r + ±)J(p ¡ njy) = [1 ¡ FZ(zM(p ¡ n + y))[p ¡ n + y + zM(p ¡ n + y)]:
Di®erentiation yields
(r + ±)J
0(p ¡ njy) = 1 ¡ FZ(zM(p ¡ n + y)):
If the ¯rm is at a corner this follows immediately, as zM(p ¡ n + y) does not respond
to a change in p ¡ n. If the solution to the ¯rm's problem is interior this relationship
follows from the envelope theorem. Since the threshold zM is chosen optimally, the ¯rm
cannot gain at the margin from adjusting the threshold, so the bene¯t from an increase
in p ¡ n is just the direct e®ect on the rents that the ¯rm earns from the workers is is
already trading with.









This proves di®erentiability of J(p ¡ n), Increasing Firm's Rents, as well as Regular
Firm's Rents. Recall that with NB match formation is ex post e±cient, and the envelope
20theorem applies to the overall rents, that is (r + ±)(J 0 + G0) = ». Here the envelope
theorem delivers (r + ±)J 0 = ». Due to the monopoly ine±ciency, one generally has
(r + ±)(J 0 + G0) > ».
We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 1 the ¯rm o®er monopoly model satis¯es (i) Location
Invariance, (ii) Positive Selection, (iii) Increasing Firm's and Worker's Rents and (iv)
Regular Firm's Rents.
Thus, under weak assumptions, this model of wage determination satis¯es those
properties which are su±cient for the bounds of Propositions 1 and 2.
5.2 Unilateral Wage Request by the Worker
By symmetry with the ¯rm o®er model, the worker o®er monopoly model satis¯es Lo-
cation Invariance, Positive Selection and Increasing Firm's and Worker's Rents. These
are all the properties needed to apply the bound of Proposition 1.
However, for the ¯rm o®er model we only established that the rents of the o®er-
making party are regular. Now the ¯rm is at the receiving end of the o®er. To apply
the second bound, we need Regular Rents of the o®er-receiving party. Using notation
symmetric to the ¯rm o®er model, in the worker o®er model
(r + ±)J
0(p ¡ njz) = ¡y
0
M(p ¡ n + z)[1 ¡ FY(yM(p ¡ n + z))] (17)
at points of di®erentiability of yM(p ¡ n + z). Here yM(p ¡ n + z) is the threshold
productivity level chosen by the worker with amenity value z. Only ¯rm types that the
worker has already been trading with experience an increase in their informational rent,
which is why the probability of trade 1 ¡ FY(yM(p ¡ n + z)) appears in equation (17).
How large the increase in the informational rent is for these ¯rm types depends on how
many more ¯rm types the worker wants to trade with, that is the drop in the threshold
¡y0
M(p¡n+z). If the worker lowers the threshold substantially, then the increase in the
¯rm's informational rent will be large. Now suppose the worker reduces the threshold
less than one for one with an increase in p ¡ n, that is ¡y0
M(p ¡ n + z) · 1. Then
(r + ±)J




M(p ¡ n + z)[1 ¡ FY(yM(p ¡ n + z))]dFZ(z)
·
Z
[1 ¡ FY(yM(p ¡ n + z))]dFZ(z) = »(p ¡ n);
21enough to insure Regular Firm's Rents. The following strengthening of the second part
of Assumption 1 insures that ¡y0
M · 1.
Assumption 2 The hazard rate
F0
Y (y)
1¡FY (y) is weakly increasing and continuously di®eren-
tiable on [y; ¹ y].
To understand the role of a monotone hazard rate, consult the worker's ¯rst order
condition for an optimal wage request to the ¯rm:





If in response to an increase in p ¡ n the worker reduced yM one for one, then the left
hand side, which is the marginal bene¯t from trading with another ¯rm type, would
be unchanged. However, under Assumption 2 the worker would end up at a point with
a lower hazard rate, that is the loss of trade associated with a more aggressive wage
request is smaller relative to the number of ¯rms that would pay the higher wage. It
follows that it is optimal to reduce the threshold less than one for one.
Thus we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Under Assumption 1 the worker request monopoly model satis¯es (i)
Location Invariance, (ii) Positive Selection and (iii) Increasing Firm's and Worker's
Rents. If part (b) of Assumption 1 is strengthened to Assumption 2, then this model
also satis¯es Regular Firm's Rents.
The stronger Assumption 2 of a monotone hazard is su±cient to apply Propositions
2. We emphasize that it is not needed for the bound of Proposition 1.
6 The Constrained E±cient Allocation
We now turn to the constrained e±cient allocation in the presence of bilateral asym-
metric information, as in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) [MS83]. Parties have access
to a mediator, who receives announcements about the draws of private information, y
and z; and recommends a binding trading decision and wage. In this wage negotiation
context, the mediator enforcing the rules of the game can be thought of as an arbitrator
of a labor dispute.
The constrained e±cient allocation is of great interest for two reasons. First, it
features the maximal expected gains from trade in the equilibrium of any unmediated
bargaining game. Therefore, if this allocation satis¯es our properties and tames the
22ampli¯cation of productivity shocks, any other wage-setting rule under asymmetric in-
formation can provide ampli¯cation only through some form of ine±ciency in trading.
If rents are shared e±ciently, there cannot be su±cient ampli¯cation. Second, this allo-
cation is always unique and, for some classes of belief distributions, can be implemented
through a sealed-bid double auction. Therefore, the indeterminacy of the set of e±cient
equilibria of the double auction under complete information, exploited by Hall (2005)
to generate su±cient wage rigidity, breaks down under any modicum of asymmetric
information.
For the constrained e±cient allocation, it is straightforward to verify Location In-
variance and Positive Selection. However, we have not yet been able to uncover simple
su±cient conditions for properties such as Increasing Firm's and Worker's Rents and
Regular Firm's Rents. So far we can only show that the bounds of Section 4 apply to
some special cases, which are considered at the end of this section. Speci¯cally, under
the assumption of symmetric beliefs one can also establish Increasing Rents, so Propo-
sition 3 applies. We also specialize further to the case of uniform symmetric beliefs.
This case has received particular attention due to the fact that the constrained e±cient
allocation can be implemented through an equilibrium of the 1
2-double auction analyzed
by Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983). It is also of particular interest here because in
this case the property Regular Firm's Rents holds, so the conditions of Proposition 2
are satis¯ed. Finally, we verify that Proposition 1 applies to asymmetric beliefs of the
exponential class.
The Mechanism Design Problem. A mediator, or principal, receives reports ^ y
and ^ z by the two parties and enforces a probability of trade x(^ y; ^ z;p;n) and a wage
w(^ y; ^ z;p;n) so as to maximize the sum of expected values to the two parties. The
reports are a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this optimal mechanism. That is, the e±cient
mechanism is a direct revelation game whose Bayesian Nash equilibrium produces the
constrained e±cient allocation.
Given a pair of reports ^ y; ^ z and realizations y;z, the ¯rm's value is
J(^ y; ^ z;y;p;n) =
p + y ¡ w(^ y; ^ z;p;n)
r + ±
(19)
and the worker's value
W(^ y; ^ z;z;p;n) =
z + w(^ y; ^ z;p;n) ¡ ±U
r + ±
=
z + w(^ y; ^ z;p;n) ¡ ±n=r
r + ±
: (20)
The constrained e±cient allocation obtained through a direct revelation mechanism













U [1 ¡ x(y;z;p;n)]dFY(y)dFZ (z)
subject to (intermim) Individual Rationality (IR) and Incentive Compatibility (IC) con-
straints of the ¯rm: for all y; ^ y 2 [y; ¹ y]
Z ¹ z
z





J(^ y;z;y;p;n)x(^ y;z)dFZ (z)
À
(21)
and of the worker: for all z; ^ z 2 [y; ¹ y]
Z ¹ y
y






fW(y; ^ z;z;p;n)x(y; ^ z) + U [1 ¡ x(y; ^ z;p;n)]gdFY(y)
+
:
We can rewrite the problem as follows. Subtract n(r + ±)=r from both sides of last
equation, use (19) and (20), ignore constant terms independent of choice variables, to


























[z + w(y; ^ z;p;n) ¡ n]x(y; ^ z;p;n)dFY(y)
+
:
Notice that this is not a constrained e±cient allocation for society: here parties take
the outside option n = rU as given, and just mind the division of rents. The objective
function is independent of the wage w, which only plays the role of a transfer function
to induce parties to truthfully reveal their valuations, thus only enters the IC and IR
constraints.
24Proposition 6 There exists a unique constrained e±cient trading rule: trade i® y ¸
y¤(z) where the decreasing function y¤ = y¤(z) uniquely solves
y




























dFY(y)dFZ (z) ¸ 0
which is equivalent to all IC and IR constraints.
Notice that the ex post e±cient trading rule, trade i® y +p¡n+z ¸ 0, holds if and
only if the constraint is not binding, hence ¹ = 0, which happens if and only if p ¡ n is
large enough that the supports of p + y and z ¡ n are su±ciently disjoint.
Location Invariance and Di®erentiability. We can also state the e±cient trading
rule in terms of the worker's private value: trade occurs i® z ¸ z¤(y;p¡n) = y¤¡1(y;p¡
n). Either way, the higher the valuation a party has for the match, the more likely she
expects trade to be. By the implicit function theorem, these cuto® functions y¤ and z¤
are also di®erentiable in p ¡ n:
The probability of trading conditional on private information, say, for a worker of
type z is 1 ¡ FY(y¤(z;p ¡ n)) and unconditional on private information it is
»









As shown in MS83, the expected value to each party, unconditional on trade but



















Notice that G¤(zjp ¡ n) is increasing in z and J ¤(yjp ¡ n) is increasing in y, so the IR
constraints G¤(zjp ¡ n) ¸ 0 and J ¤(yjp ¡ n) ¸ 0 for each type of worker and ¯rm are
satis¯ed if they are for the lowest types y and z. By Theorem 2 in MS83, these are




25Taking expectations w.r. to private information, we can ¯nally obtain the expected














¤(z;p ¡ n))][1 ¡ FZ(z)]dz














¤(y;p ¡ n))][1 ¡ FY(y)]dy:
By inspection, »
¤(p ¡ n), G¤(p ¡ n) and J ¤(p ¡ n) are di®erentiable with respect to
p ¡ n. Therefore, Location Invariance and di®erentiability hold. Notice also that these
values are uniquely de¯ned by the trading rule y¤, that we proved to uniquely exist,
and do not depend on the payment function w¤, which is de¯ned residually. Therefore,
G¤ and J ¤ are uniquely de¯ned, a key property to meaningfully test our comparative
statics property.
Positive Selection. Using the e±cient trading rule, the maximized expected °ow
gains from trade (r + ±)S¤ = (r + ±)(G¤ + J ¤) can be written as follows:




y¤(z;p¡n)(p + y + z ¡ n)dFY(y)dFZ (z)
= »
¤(p ¡ n) ¢ (p ¡ n) +
R ¹ z
z fz + E[yjy ¸ y¤(z;p ¡ n)]g[1 ¡ FY(y¤(z;p ¡ n))]dFZ (z)
= »
¤(p ¡ n)f(p ¡ n) +
R ¹ z
z fz + E[yjy ¸ y¤(z;p ¡ n)]g
1¡FY (y¤(z;p¡n)) R ¹ z
z [1¡FY (y¤(z0;p¡n))]dFZ(z0)dFZ (z)g
= »
¤(p ¡ n) ¢
n
(p ¡ n) +
R ¹ z




where H¤ is the cdf of the worker's valuation conditional on trade. Then notice that
E[yjy ¸ y¤(z;p ¡ n)] ¸ E[y] = 0 so the inequality is also true when averaging over
dH¤(z). Next, as the cuto® y¤(z;p ¡ n) is decreasing in z, it is easy to verify that




z zdFZ (z) = 0. Overall, we conclude that Positive
Selection holds: (r + ±)S¤(p ¡ n) ¸ (p ¡ n) ¢ »
¤(p ¡ n):
Increasing Rents. To apply the ¯rst bound from Proposition 1, using the above
expression, it remains to show
G
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Since the denominator is positive by Assumption 1, a su±cient condition is that ¹=(1+
¹); thus the Lagrange multiplier ¹; be non-increasing in p¡n: This implies that, as the
average gains from trade p¡n rise, the critical trading cuto® y¤(z;p¡n) declines for all
z; or z¤(y;p ¡ n) declines for all y, so the trading set becomes larger and both parties
gain. While we have not yet been able to sign this derivative in general, we can establish
it for some special cases.
A Special Case: Symmetric Beliefs. In the special case FY = FZ the third bound
from Proposition 3 applies provided also that the ¯rm has increasing rents. By the
envelope theorem (r+±)S¤0(p¡n) = (1+¹)¢»
¤(p¡n) > 0 so, by symmetry, G¤(p¡n) =
J ¤(p ¡ n) = S¤(p ¡ n)=2 and
G
¤0(p ¡ n) = J











Since beliefs are symmetric, this is a special case of the preceding special case, and the
bound of Proposition 3 applies. Nevertheless it provides an instructive example since it
also satis¯es the assumptions of Proposition 2, in particular Regular Firm's Rents. We





. Over this range the Langrange multiplier
is constant at ¹ = 1
2, and one also obtains the simple closed form solutions







(1 + (p ¡ n))
2 ;







(1 + (p ¡ n))
3 :
Thus one can directly verify that the increase in the rents of the ¯rm are bounded by
the probability of trade, hence they are regular:
(r + ±)J
0(p ¡ n) =
3
4
»(p ¡ n) < »(p ¡ n):
27A Special Case: Asymmetric Exponential Beliefs Now suppose that y and z are
positive real numbers with FY(y) = 1 ¡ e¡°y; FZ(z) = 1 ¡ e¡¸z for some ¸;° > 0: We
can subtract the means 1=¸ and 1=° and absorb them into p and ¡n to make y and z












¡ z ¡ (p ¡ n):








¡ (p ¡ n) we have y¤(z;¹) · 0 and so trade occurs for sure, as
y ¸ 0 ¸ y¤(z;¹), while for z 2 [0;k) trade may fail. We will show that the Lagrange
multiplier ¹ associated to the IC constraint is nonincreasing in p¡n; which implies that
all types trade more often and gain.
If the IC constraint is not binding, then ¹ = 0; d¹=d(p ¡ n) = 0, and we are done.


































































After much algebra, we can compute these integrals. After rearranging, we obtain an














If ¸ = °; a symmetric model, this equation, thus ¹, is independent of p ¡ n, so again
d¹=d(p ¡ n) = 0, and we are done. In any event, the left hand side is positive, so the
right hand side must be positive too, namely, (¸¹ ¡ °)=(°¹ ¡ ¸) > 0. In an asymmetric








It follows that, as average gains from trade p¡n rise, the incentive problem is lessened,
the cuto® y¤ declines with p¡n, both parties gain, and the ¯rst bound from Proposition
1 applies.
287 Discussion and Conclusions
The analysis of various di®erent wage-determination mechanisms uncovers important
similarities. Location Invariance implies that the ¯rm's share of the pie depends on
the worker's outside option. In most natural models trade occurs if total rents exceed
a cuto®, so Positive Selection holds. Next is the property of Increasing Rents. Both
parties must bene¯t from an increase in the average gains from trade p ¡n. In general,
the envelope theorem implies that the player who is maximizing an objective function
gains from an increase in p ¡ n. In the monopoly case, this gain accrues to the o®er-
making party and is exactly equal to the probability of trade. The initial optimal wage
o®er/request must appropriately balance the chance of trade and the returns conditional
on trade. This implies that an increase in p¡n must be transmitted in part to the o®er
to raise the chance of trade. The o®er recipient also bene¯ts, because the o®er rises
to make trade more likely for the party who extends it. In the e±cient mechanism,
the envelope theorem applies to the principal. The maximized expected rents rise in
p ¡ n even faster than the chance of trade, due to the incentive constraints. In the
(near-)symmetric case, this overall gain to the match is shared by ¯rm and worker, who
are then both better o®.
Finally, albeit not strictly necessary for the main results, is the property of Regular
Firm's Rents: as mean °ow gains from trade p ¡ n rise, we require that the expected
¯rm's pro¯ts rise less than the chance of trade. If not, the response of job creation
could be strong enough to generate unemployment °uctuations of plausible magnitude.
This is the hardest property to verify. As said, in the monopoly case, the payo®s to
the o®er-making party rise exactly like the chance of trade, by an envelope theorem
argument. In the e±cient mechanism, an additional opposing force comes into play. If
incentive constraints are binding and severely limit trade, an increase in aggregate labor
productivity can relax them so as to boost the chance of trade, with a multiplier e®ect
on the rents of the ¯rm and the worker. That is, more favorable business conditions may
help circumvent the ine±ciency due to asymmetric information, which manifests itself
in failed wage negotiations. In this case, the ¯rm's pro¯t gain following a productivity
boom could be su±ciently large to o®set the indirect impact of job creation on wages
through the worker's outside option. In the aggregate, job creation may surge enough to
produce a sharp fall in unemployment. We remark that this would obtain not through
wage rigidity but via a change in the \quantity" dimension of matching, namely the
probability of a mutually acceptable agreement.
Revisiting some of the recent contributions to the debate, as well as the role of
29asymmetric information, points to the following direction. To eliminate the feedback
e®ect we need to weaken the link between the worker's outside option and the wage. This
can be accomplished, for example, through strategic bargaining as in Hall and Milgrom
(2005). This leaves the congestion e®ect to be dealt with. To eliminate the latter, one
must make the level of the ¯rm's rent small while making the rent very responsive to
changes in the °ow gains from trade at the margin. In Hall and Milgrom's symmetric
information model the level of the ¯rm's rent and its responsiveness at the margin are
tied together, requiring them to evade the congestion e®ect by calibrating the cost of
delay so as to generate a large bias in favor of the worker. Asymmetric information
provides a way to disentangle the level of the ¯rm's rent and it's responsiveness at
the margin. Thus, a combination of strategic bargaining and asymmetric information
(arguably the more realistic, albeit complex, of all the environments considered so far)
may be the solution. Therefore, to reconcile the representative agent equilibrium search
model with the empirical evidence on employment °uctuations, while maintaining that
unemployment is costly for society, we may need to abandon the representative agent
and to introduce heterogeneity. In this paper, we showed that two natural attempts in
this direction fail, and yet they shed new light on the internal mechanism of the standard
search model.
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31A Appendix. Proof of Proposition 6
To solve this mechanism design problem, we appeal to MS83's formulation, and map
our problem in their framework. Let À ´ p + y; ³ ´ n ¡ z; ©(³) ´ 1 ¡ FZ (n ¡ ³), so
©0 (³)d³ = F 0
Z (n ¡ ³)d³ = ¡F 0
Z (z)dz, ¡(À) ´ FY(À¡p); so ¡0 (À)dÀ = F 0
Y(À¡p)dÀ =
F 0
Y(y)dy: Then the e±cient mechanism maximizes expected gains from trade subject to











[À ¡ w(^ À;³)]x(^ À;³)d©(³)
À
Z













This is the same formulation as in MS83. We apply their terminology and results. Let
the \virtual types" be
Qf (À;®) ´ À ¡ ®
1 ¡ ¡(À)
¡0 (À)
and Qw (³;®) ´ ³ + ®
©(³)
©0 (³)
which are, respectively, increasing in À and decreasing in ³ by Assumption 1. Then IR,
IC and budget balance are equivalent to
Z Z
[Qf (À;1) ¡ Qw (³;1)]x(À;³)d©(³)d¡(y) ¸ 0






fÀ ¡ ³ + ¹[Qf (À;1) ¡ Qw (³;1)]gx(À;³)d©(³)d¡(y)
where ¹ is the multiplier. The FOC is
x
¤ (À;³) = IfÀ ¡ ³ + ¹[Qf (À;1) ¡ Qw (³;1)] > 0g = IfQf(À;M) > Qw(³;M)g









32so that trade occurs i® À > À¤(³;M), which is the same as y ¸ y¤ ´ À¤ ¡ p:
Assumption 1 implies that y¤ is decreasing in z, and that Qf(:;1) and Qw(:;1) are
increasing. Then Qf(À;M) and Qw(³;M) are also increasing for every M 2 [0;1] (see
MS83 who state this without proof; there is a simple proof by contradiction). It follows
(MS83 Theorem 2) that an e±cient mechanism exists, and the e±cient rule is: trade i®
À > À¤ (³;M) for a cuto® function À¤ de¯ned implicitly by
À
¤ (³;M) ¡ ³ = M
½







Using our de¯nitions, this is (23).
To show uniqueness, proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exist two dis-
tinct e±cient allocations fx¤
igi=1;2. Given the nature of the optimal rule (trade if
À > À¤ (³;M)) these two mechanisms must be associated to two di®erent values of




2 (À;³) = x
¤




1 (À;³) = 1 > 0 = x
¤





1 (À;³) = x
¤











so that the second mechanism, associated to the higher Lagrange multiplier, yields a
strictly smaller objective function, and cannot be optimal.
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